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MARBURY'S WRONGNESS 
Michael Stokes Paulsen* 
Is it possible that everything in Marbury v. Madison-except 
for the theorem of judicial review-is wrong? Surely, in the col-
orful, confident words of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury, 
such a proposition "is too extravagant to be maintained."1 Such 
an assertion about the foundational case of American constitu-
tional law would be "an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. "2 
But I insist: Just about everything in Marbury is wrong, in-
cluding the holding? 
First, a thumbnail sketch of what the case holds and what 
the case asserts (in dictum): On application of William Marbury, 
the Supreme Court, acting (apparently) in original jurisdiction, 
issued an order to Secretary of State James Madison to show 
cause why a writ of mandamus should not be entered against 
him directing him to provide Marbury with his commission as a 
justice of the peace for the District of Columbia. Madison ig-
nored the show cause order, the case was argued before the 
Court, and a year and a half later (following various other inter-
esting events involving the Republican Congress's actions with 
respect to the federal judiciary)4 the Court made several distinct 
pronouncements. First, Mr. Marbury was entitled to his commis-
Briggs & Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. 
Graduate, John Marshall Elementary School (Wausau, Wisconsin 1971). I would like to 
thank Eddie Hartnell, Dan Farber, and John Nagle for invaluable comments. 
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803). 
2. /d. at 177. 
3. In this essay, I play the rude guest at Marbury's 200'h birthday party, emphasiz-
ing all that is wrong with the case. I am not always so churlish. I praise Marbury's analysis 
on the question of judicial review (and lament its betrayal by the modern Court and 
scholars) in another anniversary essay. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of 
Marbury, _ MICH. L. REV. _ (2003). There, I cheer what is right about Marbury. 
Here, I jeer what is wrong about Marbury. 
4. For entertaining and illuminating accounts, see Larry Kramer, Marbury and the 
Retreat from Judicial Supremacy, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 205 (2003); John Copeland 
Nagle, The Lame Ducks of Marbury, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 317 (2003); and Jack M. 
Balkin & Sandy Levinson, What are the Facts of Marbury v. Madison?, 20 CONST. 
COMMENT. 255 (2003). 
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sion because his appointment had been, following last-minute 
Senate confirmation, signed by President John Adams and 
sealed by the Secretary of State for the outgoing Adams admini-
stration-John Marshall. That made the appointment complete, 
notwithstanding Marshall's failure to deliver it before the ad-
ministration of President Thomas Jefferson took over. Conse-
quently, Madison, Jefferson's cabinet officer, had a duty to de-
liver it.5 
Second, the Court held, a writ of mandamus directed to Sec-
retary Madison was an appropriate remedy. The courts may is-
sue mandatory orders to executive branch officers, where there 
exists a legal duty that such officers are (in the judgment of the 
Court) violating. Of course, the Court would never pretend to 
tell the President or his officers how to perform their political 
duties-the Court should not decide such political questions-
but where the law imposes a nondiscretionary ministerial duty 
on an executive branch officer, the Courts can order that officer 
to do his duty.6 
The third question gave rise to the holding for which Mar-
bury is justifiably celebrated-the theorem of judicial review, 
deduced from the structural and textual premises of constitu-
tional supremacy.7 That question was whether section 13 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 legitimately conferred original jurisdiction 
on the Supreme Court to issue the writ of mandamus. The Court 
construed section 13 as authorizing such action by the Court, but 
concluded that this enlarged the original jurisdiction of the 
Court in violation of the Original Jurisdiction Clause of Article 
III of the Constitution.8 Finally-here comes the proposition of 
judicial review-the Court held that it could not properly give 
effect to an unconstitutional statute of the legislature.9 Thus, the 
Court lacked proper jurisdiction and could not grant Marbury 
the requested writ of mandamus. 
How many things are probably wrong with this picture? At 
least six, by my count. 
5. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 167-68. 
6. ld. at 170-71. 
7. For the use of the mathematical term "theorem," and discussion of the constitu-
tional postulates from which Marbury's holding of judicial review derives, see Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 
83 GEORGETOWN L.J. 217,226-27,241-62 (1994). For a celebration of this holding and its 
implications, see Paulsen, supra note 3. 
8. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 175-76. 
9. /d. at 180. 
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1. For openers, why should William Marbury's appointment 
(or anyone else's) be considered complete when it has been 
signed and sealed, but not delivered? If the President, through 
his subordinates, has not bestowed the commission on an officer 
of the United States-has not given it to him-has he really been 
commissioned as an officer of the United States? Does he really 
hold the office if he doesn't hold the "deed" denoting him the 
officeholder? Chief Justice Marshall's opinion on this score has 
always struck me as dubious, and the best evidence of the "mis-
chief" theory of the opinion. If an appointment is complete upon 
signing by the President (for the life of me I cannot figure out 
what possible constitutional significance affixing the seal of the 
United States might have), then delivery is utterly immaterial. If 
that is the case, then Marbury had no real beef with Madison in 
the first place. He was legally appointed the nanosecond that 
President Adams signed the commission. He did not need to sue 
for delivery of the commission. All he needed to do was ride to 
the tailor, order a nice robe made, and walk into the courthouse 
and start deciding cases. 
In fact, why didn't he do so after Chief Justice Marshall is-
sued his (advisor(u) quasi-declaratory-judgment opinion in Mar-
bury v. Madison? 0 After all, the opinion "holds" (after a fashion) 
that Marbury was lawfully appointed, because an appointment is 
complete upon signing and sealing. Surely no one would dispute 
his authority now! 
Ah, but who would pay his salary? There's the rub-and, 
probably, the real nub of the dispute. What would happen when 
Marbury, after deciding cases for a few weeks, demanded his 
pay? President Jefferson almost surely would have directed his 
subordinates that Marbury was not a judge and should not be 
paid from the treasury. (In fact, President Jefferson might even 
have ordered this Judge Pretender removed from the court-
house.) 
Thus, the real underlying dispute probably was whether 
William Marbury would be paid for the gig. Delivery of the piece 
of paper itself was no big deal. As Marshall wrote for the Court, 
delivery concerns "a paper, which, according to law, is upon re-
cord, and to a copy of which the law gives a right, on the pay-
10. Larry Alexander makes this point in his fascinating (though in most respects 
utterly misguided!) contribution to this symposium. Larry Alexander, Constitutional 
Rules, Constitutional Standards, and Constitutional Settlement: Marbury v. Madison and 
the Case for Judicial Supremacy, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 369,370 (2003). 
346 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:343 
ment of ten cents ... ". 11 But the piece of paper would have been 
Marbury's proof that he was entitled to pay for his work. There 
was no way, however, that Marshall was going to order President 
Jefferson to pay Marbury's salary, for the simple reason that 
there was no way Jefferson would feel obliged to obey such an 
order.12 
2. This points to a second obvious flaw in the case. The sal-
ary issue-the real, concrete stake of the parties-should remind 
every student of constitutional law of the famous "removal 
power" line of cases: Myers, Humphrey's Executor, Weiner, and 
Morrison v. Olson. 13 Most of these were suits for salaries by fired 
executive branch officers. The constitutionally correct answer, 
which the Supreme Court has seldom gotten right, is that the 
President, as the sole repository of the executive power of the 
United States, must have the power to direct and control all ex-
ercises of executive power by all subordinate officers.14 This 
means the President must have the power to countermand sub-
ordinates' actions and (though this is slightly less certain) to re-
move subordinates who are insubordinate. 
William Marbury was to have been a justice of the peace for 
the District of Columbia. True, this is in form a judicial office, 
but within the scheme of the Constitution, it is not an Article III 
judgeship but an agency, judicial in form, through which the na-
tional government administers the federal district over which it 
has exclusive jurisdiction. To cut to the chase, Marbury would 
have been the early nineteenth century equivalent of an adminis-
trative law judge-a glorified bureaucrat-whose administrative 
decisions should be subject to the President's direction and con-
trol and who should be removable at will by the President as a 
subordinate executive branch peon. Thus, even if Marbury were 
11. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170. 
12. As several contributors to this symposium noted in their oral remarks, the one 
key feature of Marshall's strategy was that Marbury had to lose, so that Jefferson had no 
adverse order to defy (as I think he surely would have, see Paulsen, supra note 7 at 307), 
so that judicial authority would not be undermined. As I discuss below, this too is wrong 
in principle. If a litigant is entitled to judicial relief, that relief should not be withheld on 
the ground that the executive might disagree and nullify the Court's judgment. There is 
no legitimate room for a court to retreat from exercising its duty to render proper judg-
ment, on pragmatic grounds of husbanding its own capital. See infra at 356-57. 
13. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 60 (1926); Humphrey's Executor v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 602, 612 (1935); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 351 (1958). Mor-
rison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), of course, challenged the power of an executive 
branch official to take prosecutorial action, not official deprivation of an official's salary. 
14. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Presidency and the Courts After 
Twenty-Five Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1342-43, 1390-97 (1999). 
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lawfully appointed, President Jefferson should have been able to 
remove him.15 At the very least, the point is fairly arguable. 16 
I think the better answer is that Marbury's appointment was 
never completed, and even if it was, he was a removable-at-will 
subordinate executive officer. In either event, it seems plain that 
Marbury was not legally entitled to serve as justice of the peace 
for the District, against President Jefferson's wishes. The most 
he might have been entitled to was damages in some form-
recovery of a salary, if the office was wrongfully withheld. 
3. That leads to Dubious Holding Number Three. Why is 
mandamus to deliver a commission an appropriate remedy in the 
first place? If Marbury is not an Article III judge (Justice of the 
Peace for the District of Columbia was a five-year statutory of-
fice), why is not the appropriate remedy one for damages for a 
wrongfully withheld salary-the form of relief sought in the 
Myers-Humphrey's Executor line of cases?17 My day job is as a 
Civil Procedure teacher, but alas, I teach modern-day civil pro-
cedure and enjoy a certain blissful ignorance of things archaic 
and procedural.18 My perspective therefore tends to be some-
what anachronistic-critiquing common law procedures by way 
of modern perspectives-but sometimes anachronism, untainted 
by actual knowledge, is a good thing. 
I am reliably informed by people more knowledgeable 
about such things that, at the time of Marbury, mandamus was 
regarded as a coercive remedy at law, not a form of equitable re-
lief, but still an extraordinary remedy available only when no or-
dinary remedy will do.19 And Mr. Marbury, unlike the plaintiffs 
in the Myers-Humphrey's Executor line, had no Court of Claims 
15. Consider Jefferson's later remark that it was "personally unkind" of Adams to 
have made last-minute appointments making it difficult for Jefferson to carry out his ad-
ministration without having to either work through subordinates not of like mind or to 
fire such men. Nagle, supra note 4 at 317. 
16. See also Akhil Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1989). The best series of articles about the im-
plied executive removal power, flowing from the unitary executive, has been written by 
Steve Calabresi and his co-authors. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, 
The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. 
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Ju-
diciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992). 
17. See note 12, supra. 
18. When I have questions about such things, I call Eddie Hartnett, who is blissfully 
well-informed about such matters (and much else). See, e.g., Edward Hartnett, Not the 
King's Bench, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 283 (2003). 
19. My thanks to Eddie Hartnett, see supra note 18, and to Dan Farber for pointing 
this out to me. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY 
RULE 13 (1991). 
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in which to bring a damages action for recovery of his salary. 
Probably such an action would have been regarded by folks of 
the day, as by many folks today, as barred by sovereign immu-
nity unless consented to by the government. (Such folks, then 
and now, would be wrong, I think, for reasons well explained by 
others?0) 
The failure to relegate Mr. Marbury to a damages remedy 
thus may count as another error of the case, albeit one entangled 
in numerous other misconceptions of the day. But Chief Justice 
Marshall's unexceptionable statement that every right ought to 
have a remedy21 surely overlooks the possibility that mandamus 
is not necessarily the single appropriate remedy for this case. 
Marshall thus errs, again, when he says (rejecting an alternative 
remedy of "detinue"- about which I know essentially nothing) 
that "[t]he value of a public office not to be sold, is incapable of 
being ascertained; and the applicant has a right to the office it-
self, or to nothing. "22 
Come again? The value of the office, to Marbury, is its sal-
ary, insofar as Marbury has any individual right. Mr. Marbury, if 
wrongfully refused his commission, should have pursued a dam-
ages remedy to recover the salary he would have received for be-
ing a Justice of the Peace. To be sure, there might be something 
"cool" about being a judge, apart from the salary, even if the 
judgeship is a rinky-dink one. To be sure, the Federalists as a 
party and perhaps some segment of the public might want Mar-
bury to have his office, not just his salary, for the benefit of the 
common weal. But Marbury was the litigant, and the proper role 
of the courts (even more so then than now) is not to provide a 
forum for airing generalized grievances of the public, but (in 
Marbury's words), "solely, to decide on the rights of individu-
als. "23 Marshall got that point right, at least. But if Marbury's 
personal interests are all that is at stake, mandamus to an execu-
tive branch officer to deliver a commission for a federal office 
would seem an improper remedy. 
That brings me to another complaint with the mandamus 
remedy. In the American Constitutional System, with its separa-
20. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 
1425 (1987). The short of it is that the idea of sovereign immunity ought not, in America, 
bar suits against government and government officials. The people are sovereign; gov· 
ernment officials are mere agents. See generally id. 
21. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163 (quoting Blackstone). 
22. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 173 
23. /d. at 170. 
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tion of powers, where does a court get off making coercive or-
ders to the executive, a coordinate branch of government, as if 
the executive must obey them? I have beaten this horse, or one 
of a similar color, in other writing and will not re-inflict the in-
jury here.24 I will merely note that "mandamus," in traditional 
English practice, was a way in which the King's courts, acting in 
the name of the King, ordered the King's officers to carry out 
their King-mandated duties. Or at least that was the legal fiction. 
Even in Marbury, the order to show cause is directed to Secre-
tary Madison, not President Jefferson. (And in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the nominal defendant is Secretary 
Sawyer, not President Truman.)25 But this legal fiction collapses, 
in the regime of the U.S. Constitution. The courts are not the 
king's courts, doing his bidding, but a coordinate branch that 
cannot with propriety either give binding commands to the ex-
ecutive or be commanded by the executive. Under correct un-
derstandings of a unitary executive branch, Madison's obedience 
to the chief executive is a matter for the chief executive to as-
sure. Conversely, judicial orders directed to Secretary Madison 
are judicial orders directed to President Jefferson. Jefferson un-
derstood this, and this was what he found objectionable about 
Marshall's decision in Marbury. 26 
Thus, even if Marbury had been duly appointed (which I 
doubt) and even if he were not a removable-at-will subordinate 
executive branch administrative law judge (which I believe he 
was), mandamus relief-a coercive order directed to the execu-
tive branch-would seem to be the last place a court should go. 
Thus, even if Marshall had been right on the first two points, 
Marbury should have been held to have had a plain, speedy, and 
adequate alternative remedy at law, at least if the question is 
what individual relief he is entitled to. If John Marshall had been 
half as resourceful in figuring out how to get Marbury relief to 
which he was entitled as he was in figuring out how to create a 
conflict between the Judiciary Act and Article III of the Consti-
tution, he could have resolved the case on this ground. 
24. See Paulsen, supra note 14, at 1390-97; Paulsen, supra note 7, at 306-08 (arguing 
that Marbury's dictum, intimating that federal courts can issue orders to the executive, 
might be thought an assertion of judicial supremacy, in very serious tension with the rea-
soning by which Marbury finds the existence of a power and duty of constitutional legal 
review). 
25. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
26. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 307 (citing Jefferson's correspondence and maintaining 
that Jefferson surely would have disobeyed Marshall's order, had he been given the 
chance to do so). 
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4. Marbury's fourth error is one of professional ethics. The 
Con Law casebooks typically make a cute point of this, but there 
is really more than something a little bit unseemly about John 
Marshall's even having sat on this case. This is especially true if 
the claimed remedy is one of mandamus. If the remedy really 
were properly one for mandamus to compel delivery of the judi-
cial commission- if delivery were really the crux of the issue, as 
Marshall pretends-then the standard, casebook-footnote jab at 
Marshall that he should not have been sitting on a case involving 
his own conduct as an executive officer begins to have serious 
force. Sure, legal ethics standards were different in that day, but 
that is not a very persuasive defense of Marshall's misconduct. I 
am not saying that John Marshall should be hauled up posthu-
mously on disciplinary charges under some Judicial Code of 
Conduct. I am saying that the principle that makes it self-
evident, today, that a judge should not sit on a case in which the 
propriety or legal effect of his own acts or omissions in a differ-
ent, non-judicial capacity, on precisely the same specific transac-
tion at issue in the case, are themselves the basis for the legal 
claim, was just as sound a principle in 1803 as it is today. That 
principle should have led Marshall not to participate. (I have no 
similar objection to Marshall having served simultaneously as 
Secretary of State and Chief Justice. Today's prohibition on dual 
office-serving is more of a prophylactic safeguard against con-
flicts-of-interest, and strikes me as different in kind from the ob-
vious principle that one should not serve as a judge in a case in-
volving one's own conduct.)27 
I am inclined not to make too much of this error, though. 
Presumably, this meant only that John Marshall was disqualified, 
not that the Court as a whole could not have ruled on the case. 
The remaining justices might have ended up doing just what 
Marshall did. On the other hand, Marbury v. Madison is full of 
John Marshall's distinctive cleverness and occasional brilliance. 
Maybe the Court would have come out the same way, but maybe 
27. Article I, section 6 of the Constitution (the "Incompatibility Clause") specifi-
cally prohibits individuals from serving simultaneously in the Legislative and the Execu-
tive branches-which is why John Goodman, playing the role of Speaker of the House in 
the 2003 season finale of "The West Wing," is told he has to resign his seat in Congress 
before being sworn in as Acting President pursuant to the Twenty-fifth Amendment, 
when the President's daughter has been kidnapped by terrorists and the Vice President 
had previously resigned. (I'm not sure that this is right, under the Twenty-fifth Amend-
ment either, but that's a story for another day.) But there is no similar prohibition on 
dual office-holding with respect to judicial officers. See generally Steven G. Calabresi, 
One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1045, 1122-30. 
2003] MARBURY'S WRONGNESS 351 
not. Isn't that the whole reason Marshall should have disquali-
fied himself? 
5. I'm not sure how bad this next error really is. Marbury v. 
Madison, with its disavowal of judicial authority to interfere with 
"questions in their nature political" over which the executive is 
considered to have discretion,28 is sometimes said to be the origin 
of the "political question" doctrine. But it surely is not a legiti-
mate source of authority for the modern, goofy version of the 
doctrine which asserts that federal courts should (sometimes) 
not decide constitutional cases within their assigned jurisdiction 
because (a) the answer to the constitutional question is that the 
Constitution specifies some actor (or actors) possessed of the 
sole authority to determine the matter in question; (b) the an-
swer to the constitutional question is that the Constitution does 
not supply a rule of law or standard that governs the issue; or (c) 
it would be a bad thing as a policy matter for the judiciary to en-
force the meaning of the Constitution. This is a slight caricature 
of the modern doctrine, but only very slight.29 The first two as-
pects of the doctrine are false advertising. They are indirect mer-
its holdings about the meaning of the Constitution. (Thus, much 
of the modern "political question" corpus of cases really just 
consists of convoluted merits holdings about what the Constitu-
tion says or fails to say. First-year law students seem to recognize 
this, intuitively, and convey it with either their bewilderment or 
their cynicism about the doctrine. Judges and professors forge on 
as if there really were some independent constitutional content 
to the doctrine and the students just don't get it.) 
The third group of grab-bag policy reasons for not enforcing 
the Constitution is entirely illegitimate. It basically says that a 
court should refuse to enforce the law (or, in practical effect, 
may in its discretion refuse to enforce the law), in a case prop-
erly before it, because it thinks that doing so would be a bad idea 
for any of a variety of prudential or policy reasons. Imagine it: a 
court may, on its own motion, decline to grant relief in a case 
where the Constitution (by hypothesis) does supply a rule and 
that rule does not assign plenary discretion to some other 
28. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170. ("Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by 
the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court"). 
29. For the classic, sanitized (and deceptive) formulation of the doctrine, see Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). I have parsed the political question doctrine at some-
what greater length in a very short section of a very long article. Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-seventh 
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 713 (1993) (discussing the doctrine as applied to the 
constitutional amendment process). 
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branch. And the reason for doing so is that it would be embar-
rassing, or produce interbranch conflict, for the courts to enforce 
the Constitution! Justice Brennan in all his glory was not (much) 
more judicial activist than this.30 
But this folly cannot fairly be laid at the feet of John Mar-
shall. His point is simple: unless the Constitution (or statute) 
specifies a legal rule that governs the executive branch's conduct, 
courts cannot order executive officials around. To otherwise "in-
termeddle with the prerogatives of the executive" would be 
plainly improper. In Marshall's words: 
It is scarcely necessary for the court to disclaim all pretensions 
to such a jurisdiction. An extravagance, so absurd and exces-
sive, could not have been entertained for a moment. ... Ques-
tions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitu-
tion and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made 
in this court. 31 
That much is clearly right. If the executive has acted unlawfully, 
it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say so, 
in a case properly within its jurisdiction. (That does not mean 
that the executive is necessarily bound by the judiciary's deter-
mination in this regard, but that is a hobby horse I have ridden 
elsewhere. )32 The power of the judiciary to issue legal judgments 
against the executive parallels the power of the judiciary to issue 
legal judgments holding an act of Congress unconstitutional. The 
judiciary can so act when, and only when, the executive has 
acted unlawfully. It may not act to interfere with the lawful exer-
cise of executive branch political discretion. 
Marbury's case was not one of political discretion, Marshall 
asserted, because delivery of a commission was not a discretion-
ary duty, but a mandatory one properly imposed by law.33 But 
that of course was the question of the merits of the claim for re-
lief. Marshall got the merits wrong, as noted above. But at least 
he did not pretend that he was declining to decide the merits on 
the ground that it was a "political question." Instead, he offered 
a different bogus excuse for supposedly not being able to decide 
the merits of the case: Marshall's pretense was that he was de-
30. In fact, wasn't Brennan the guy who wrote Baker v. Carr? 
31. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170. 
32. Paulsen, supra note 7; Paulsen, supra note 14, at 1340 (arguing that "neither 
[the judicial branch nor the executive] branch may bind the other with, or demand accep-
tance from the other of, its assertions concerning the scope of their respective constitu-
tional powers.") (emphasis deleted). 
33. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170-71. 
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dining to decide the merits because the Court lacked constitu-
tionally proper jurisdiction. 
6. Which leads me to the next flagrant error of Marbury v. 
Madison- the actual holding of the case, that the Court lacked 
jurisdiction. This aspect of the case is famously convoluted, and 
confuses first-year law students to no end. It also furnishes the 
set-up for articulation of the idea of judicial review. Let me try 
to put it succinctly, in the vain hope that some casebook editor 
will quote me to generations of future law students. First, Mar-
bury holds that Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the 
Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus 
to executive branch officers. Next, Marbury holds that this 
enlarges the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court beyond 
what Article III of the Constitution allows. Finally, in just about 
the only part of the opinion that is soundly reasoned and clearly 
correct, the Court holds that what the Constitution says always 
trumps what a statute says, in cases where they conflict. 
At this point, my quarrel is more with academic critics of 
Marbury than with Marbury itself. The standard critique of 
Marbury's statutory holding is that John Marshall read Section 
13 of the Judiciary Act incorrectly, creating a conflict with the 
Constitution where none necessarily existed. The contention is 
(in slightly varying forms) that section 13 merely authorized 
mandamus as an available remedy for the Court to employ, in 
cases where the Court properly had original or appellate juris-
diction, but did not itself purport to assign jurisdiction by virtue 
of authorizing mandamus remedies.34 
The critics have a point, and I fear that I have embraced the 
point, in passing, in other academic articles-though I sup~ose I 
could blame my co-author for forcing this view upon me. 5 But 
recent scholarship has suggested that Marshall's reading of the 
statute may well have been correct; that mandamus jurisdiction 
to order executive officers was probably thought by the First 
Congress-whether correctly or out of a habit of thinking about 
34. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 
1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 15 (1969); Amar, supra note 15, 453-64. See generally Hartnett, supra 
note 18, at 286-89 (collecting and discussing scholarship critical of Marbury on this 
ground). 
35. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 
90 CAL. L. REV 291, 381 n. 315 (2001) (making the correct point that, just because the 
First Congress did something, that does not mean that what they did was constitutional, 
but using the arguably incorrect illustration of section 13 of the Judiciary Act, deemed 
unconstitutional in Marbury, but partially excusing the First Congress on the ground that 
Marbury misread the statute by running past an obviously controlling semi-colon). 
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courts improperly transposed from the English King's Bench to 
the American Supreme Court- a proper function of a supreme 
court of general jurisdiction, and thus an independent ground for 
judicial authority.36 
Sometimes the critics of Marshall's statutory interpretation 
give their argument a slight boost by invoking the interpretive 
canon that statutes should be construed to avoid unconstitution-
ality, or even constitutional doubts. But these are themselves 
doubtful interpretive canons, as many have noted?7 In any event, 
for reasons explained in a minute, I doubt that the alleged con-
stitutional infirmity to be avoided is a real one, adding doubts 
about the constitutional doubts to be avoided to doubts about 
the correctness of the "doubts" canon. Better, I think, simply to 
ask whether section 13 is properly read as giving the Supreme 
Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus in a case like 
Marbury's, and then separately asking whether such jurisdiction, 
if conferred by statute, is foreclosed by Article III. 
Thus, though the interpretive point may not be entirely free 
of doubt, the relevant clause of section 13 seems to read most 
naturally as a legislative grant to the Supreme Court of a free-
standing "power" to issue "writs of mandamus, in cases war-
ranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts ap-
pointed, or persons holding office, under authority of the United 
States. "38 
Does such a grant of power violate Article III? Marshall's 
contention was that, at least where invoked in a case brought in 
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, such a grant of 
power constituted an enlargement of the Court's original juris-
diction beyond Article III's specific requirement that the Court 
have original jurisdiction "in all cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State 
shall be a Party."39 I will not quibble with Marshall here, for it is 
sufficient for me that there is nothing at all wrong with enlarging 
the Court's original jurisdiction beyond the ambassadors-
ministers-state-party baseline, as long as what is granted falls 
36. James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's Su-
pervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1524-25, 1539-46 (2001); see Hartnett, supra 
note 18, at 288 (discussing this view). 
37. See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, Delaware & Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1495 (1997) (collecting and discussing all the relevant objections to the 
doctrine); see also William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-
Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831 (2001). 
38. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 section 13. 
39. U.S. CONST. art. III, sec. 2, cl. 2. 
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somewhere on Article III's menu of cases to which the judicial 
power of the United States extends. Right after the Original Ju-
risdiction Clause, Article III says that "[i]n all other Cases be-
fore mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdic-
tion, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under 
such Regulations as the Congress shall make."40 It strikes me 
that the clause defining the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, when read in light of the "exceptions and regulations" 
clause that immediately follows it, is more fairly read as saying 
either that the Supreme Court must have original jurisdiction at 
least in the categories of cases specified by Article III (a view 
that would create some further problems)41 or, more plausibly 
yet, that this allocation of original jurisdiction is the default rule 
in the absence of congressional change. In either event, it would 
not follow that Congress may not add to the Court's original ju-
risdiction, as long as the addition comes from the Article III 
menu.42 
Thus, the Court's actual holding in Marbury-that the 
Court lacked jurisdiction, because Article III prohibited the au-
thority Congress granted-is wrong. The most natural reading of 
the statute was that it indeed vested the Court with authority to 
issue a writ of mandamus directed to Secretary Madison; and the 
most natural reading of Article III is that this is not unconstitu-
tional. It follows that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to de-
cide the case. Marbury v. Madison, the foundational case of 
American constitutional law, was wrongly decided. 
* * * * * 
All in all, Marbury is rife with wrongness. It wrongly held 
that the Court lacked jurisdiction. It wrongly asserted that Mr. 
Marbury's appointment had been completed. It wrongly ignored 
Jefferson's power to remove Marbury, even had he been validly 
appointed. It wrongly proclaimed that mandamus to compel the 
executive to deliver the commission was the appropriate remedy 
40. U.S. CONST. art. III, sec. 2, cl. 2. 
41. Which I will pass over here. Mostly those problems concern the inconsistency of 
such a reading with longstanding practice. That isn't necessarily a deal killer, but it seems 
like too much effort for an article like this one, where my chief point is that Section 13 
was not unconstitutional-under either of two perfectly good alternative readings of Ar-
ticle III of the Constitution. 
. 42. Professor Akhil Amar has offered some good arguments against these possibili-
ties, but concedes that his conclusion is not required by "the brute force of the words 
themselves," Amar, supra note 16, at 469, but depends on interpretive canons and state-
ments in ratification debates that could be interpreted as reading the Original Jurisdic-
tiOn Clause as a maximum and not a minimum. 
356 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:343 
to right the wrong that was wrongly found. And John Marshall 
was wrong to have sat as a judge on the case. 
None of this is to suggest that the theorem of judicial re-
view- the proposition that the Constitution must trump actions 
of subordinate government agencies inconsistent with the Con-
stitution, and that the judiciary has an independent power of 
judgment in this regard-is wrong. As I have written for a differ-
ent 200th anniversary symposium, Marbury is magnificently right 
on this important point-the point for which it is celebrated 
(but, alas, often misunderstood and misapplied).43 But there was 
nothing particularly novel or earthshattering about this proposi-
tion by the time Marbury rolled around, a decade and a half af-
ter Alexander Hamilton's ve!J similar argument for judicial re-
view in The Federalist No. 78. 
So why not just go ahead and order President Jefferson's 
Secretary of State to deliver the commission? The obvious an-
swer, which I alluded to above, is that James Madison would 
have obeyed Jefferson's order not to deliver the commission 
rather than Marshall's order to deliver it. President Jefferson 
would have been within his rights in refusing to abide by a judi-
cial decision that was wrong for all the reasons noted. Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall thus would have made his judgment and not 
had anyone to enforce it, and the case would have come to sym-
bolize not independent judicial authority but independent execu-
tive authority to act contrary to judicial decrees. 
This suggests a possible seventh way in which Marbury is 
wrong. If, as is so widely believed today, John Marshall's opinion 
was an ingenious, brilliant "masterwork of indirection"45 that art-
fully avoided head-on collision with Jefferson while advancing a 
series of claims to judicial authority, that too is deeply wrong-
wronger, surely, than a tendentious reading of appointments re-
quirements, forgetting removal authority, leaping to a wrong 
remedy, or misconstruing the original jurisdiction clause of Arti-
cle III. It is flat-out wrong knowingly to misuse judicial authority 
in a specific case in order to advance judicial power generally. It 
is likewise wrong knowingly to refrain from the proper and 
obligatory exercise of judicial authority in a specific case in order 
43. Paulsen, supra note 3. 
44. Indeed, Larry Kramer sees Marbury as something of a retreat from earlier, more 
aggressive conceptions of judicial review. Kramer, supra note 4 at 228-29. 
45. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 40 (1960). For a 
discussion of whether Marshall was sincere or mischievous, see Paulsen, supra, note 7, at 
242 n.79 and sources cited. 
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to defend judicial power generally. (That is part of the problem 
with the "political question" doctrine in some of its modern vari-
ants.) For a judge to withhold relief from William Marbury, if he 
were genuinely entitled to it, in order to advance judicial author-
ity, would be to trade away an individual litigant's legal rights for 
the judge's own personal power-surely a violation of the judi-
cial oath (and the obligation of the oath forms a prominent part 
of Marshall's argument for independent judicial review).46 
I noted earlier that many of the celebrants at this 200th an-
niversary symposium noted that Marbury "had to lose." But if 
one believes that Marshall deliberately misinterpreted either sec-
tion 13 or Article III, then Marbury's wrongness is not just tech-
nical, but rotten to the core. For the "brilliant but disingenuous" 
proposition amounts to nothing less than a contention that a 
judge properly may refuse to do justice under the law in order to 
advance his own personal power and that of other judges. How 
could we possibly celebrate such a despicable opinion as the cor-
nerstone of American constitutional law?! 
I for one have difficulty imputing such a motive to John 
Marshall.47 I would prefer to believe, perhaps against the evi-
dence, that John Marshall simply announced in good faith a lot 
of legal propositions that I, in my superior wisdom (and vantage 
point) two hundred years later, happen to think are mistaken. 
The bulk of the case against Marshall rests on inference, not evi-
dence of deliberate mischief-making. Some of those inferences 
may be unwarranted, and might say more about the character of 
scholars who cheer what they see as devious cleverness than 
about Marshall himself. Marshall may simply have been wrong 
on the law. But whether out of pure or impure motives, there are 
· an awful lot of things wrong with Marbury v. Madison. The case 
is worthy of close study, important to the nation's history, and 
magnificently right in its most famous (if misunderstood) propo-
sition. But deserving of reverence? That is "an absurdity to gross 
to be insisted on. "48 
46. See generally Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Office of the Oath, 20 CONST. 
COMMENT. 387 (2003); see also Paulsen, supra note 7, at 257-62. 
47. See David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Concept of Judicial Re-
view, 42 DUKE L.J. 279, 324 & n.146, 328 & nn.l62-164 (1992) (arguing that Marshall's 
analysis is subject to criticism but that his character was straightforward and honest). 
48. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
